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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
Petitioner Dexter Anthony Hillocks is a lawful 
permanent resident who was convicted of the Pennsylvania 
state crime of using a communication facility—i.e., a phone—
to facilitate a felony.  The question before us is whether that 
crime constitutes either an “aggravated felony” or a 
“conviction relating to a controlled substance” under federal 
immigration laws.  Either would make him removable.  
 
Typically, when deciding whether a particular state 
crime falls into those categories, the immigration courts look 
to see if the statute matches the federal definition of a 
qualifying crime.  This is known as the “categorical 
approach.”1   
 
In some instances, however, a particular statute is 
divisible into multiple alternate elements—i.e., facts that a jury 
must find beyond a reasonable doubt.  In that situation, we 
instead apply the “modified categorical approach.”  The major 
difference is that, with the modified approach, courts can look 
at the records of conviction to see which of the alternatives 
applied in a particular case; under the broader categorical 
approach, courts do not look at any court documents at all, and 
                                              
1 Under our Circuit’s current stated precedent, we do not 
apply the categorical approach to questions of whether a 
particular crime relates to a controlled substance.  However, as 
explained more fully in this Opinion, we conclude that the 
Supreme Court has directed us to apply the categorical 
approach to questions of whether a crime relates to a controlled 
substance.  
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instead “presume that the state conviction rested upon the least 
of the acts criminalized by the statute.”2   
 
The Board of Immigration Appeals concluded that the 
modified categorical approach applied to Hillocks’s conviction 
here.  Applying that approach, the Board looked to Hillocks’s 
plea colloquy and found that Hillocks used a phone to facilitate 
the sale of heroin.  The Board found that his conviction was 
therefore both an aggravated felony and related to a controlled 
substance, and accordingly ordered Hillocks removed. 
 
On appeal, Hillocks argues that the Board misapplied 
the approach.  He asserts that the various felonies that a person 
could facilitate with a phone are “means” by which the crime 
could be committed, not alternative elements, and that, under 
this analysis, his conviction does not make him removable.   
 
As we explain, we agree that the Board incorrectly 
applied the modified categorical approach.  We will vacate the 
order of removal and remand for further proceedings.  
 
I. 
 
Dexter Anthony Hillocks is a native of Trinidad and 
Tobago.  He was admitted into the United States as a lawful 
permanent resident in 2000.  His immediate family lives in the 
                                              
2 Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1568 
(2017) (internal quotations omitted). 
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U.S. as American citizens, and he also has a U.S.-born 
girlfriend living in Pennsylvania. 
 
In 2015, Hillocks pleaded nolo contendere to one 
violation of 18 Pa. C.S. § 7512(a), “criminal use of [a] 
communication facility.”  Section 7512(a) provides that: 
 
A person commits a felony of the third degree if 
that person uses a communication facility to 
commit, cause or facilitate the commission or the 
attempt thereof of any crime which constitutes a 
felony under this title or under [35 P.S. § 780-
101 et seq.], known as The Controlled 
Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.  
Every instance where the communication facility 
is utilized constitutes a separate offense under 
this section. 
After serving a prison sentence, Hillocks was released into the 
custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which 
placed him in detention.  He was charged with removability 
based on his conviction. 
 
Hillocks, representing himself pro se through most of 
his administrative proceedings, first appeared before an 
immigration judge in October 2015.  His case proceeded along 
a circuitous path through the administrative system.  As 
relevant here, an immigration judge found that Hillocks’s 
conviction made him removable under both 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an aggravated felony, and 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), as a crime relating to a controlled 
substance.  The Board upheld the immigration judge’s decision 
on appeal.  When considering whether Hillocks’s conviction 
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was an aggravated felony, the Board applied what is known in 
our Circuit as the “hypothetical federal felony test,” through 
which the Board compares a state drug-related offense to the 
federal Controlled Substances Act to see if the state crime is 
analogous to a federal offense.3  
 
The first step of this analysis is to apply the 
aforementioned categorical approach.  Here, because § 7512(a) 
criminalizes the use of a phone to commit another felony, the 
Board concluded that it had multiple alternative elements, and 
that each “specific underlying felony is an element of the 
offense.”4  Because it found § 7512(a) divisible, the Board 
applied the modified categorical approach to this crime.  
 
After reviewing Hillocks’s plea colloquy, the Board 
concluded that his conviction related to the sale of heroin.  It 
further found that this made Hillocks’s conviction under 
§ 7512(a) a categorical match with a corresponding federal 
crime, namely 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).5  Section 843(b) makes it a 
felony to “knowingly or intentionally [] use any 
communication facility in committing or in causing or 
facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting a 
                                              
3 Evanson v. Att’y Gen., 550 F.3d 284, 288-89 (3d Cir. 
2012).  The “hypothetical federal felony” test is one of two 
tests our Circuit uses to assess whether a state drug crime is an 
aggravated felony, the other being the “illicit trafficking 
element” test.  Id.  The Board concluded that the latter test did 
not apply in this case, and the issue is not before us on appeal.   
4 JA 8 (internal quotations omitted). 
5Id. 
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felony under [the Controlled Substances Act].”  The Board 
held that Hillocks’s conviction was an aggravated felony as 
defined under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), which makes it an 
aggravated felony to “illicit[ly] traffic[] in a controlled 
substance . . . including a drug trafficking crime,” and also held 
that his conviction “related to a controlled substance.”6  It 
therefore upheld Hillocks’s order of removal.  Hillocks 
appealed to our Court.7   
  
                                              
6 The Board made further conclusions, such as that 
Hillocks was ineligible for relief under the Convention Against 
Torture and had not sufficiently complied with the 
requirements for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.     
These issues are not before us on appeal and, as we vacate the 
grounds for Hillocks’s removability, moot. 
7 The immigration courts had jurisdiction over 
Hillocks’s removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.  The 
Board has jurisdiction to review his appeal under 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15.  We have jurisdiction under 8 
U.S.C. § 1252 to review final orders of removal from the 
Board.  Borrome v. Att’y Gen., 687 F.3d 150, 154 (3d Cir. 
2012). 
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II. 
 
 We review Board decisions on legal questions de novo.8  
We do not give Chevron deference9 to the Board’s legal 
determinations as to whether a particular criminal statute is an 
aggravated felony or related to a controlled substance.10 
 
Our immigration laws make individuals removable 
“based on the nature of their convictions, not based on their 
actual conduct.”11  When applying the hypothetical federal 
felony test, as the Board did, we first “‘employ a categorical 
approach by looking to the statute of conviction, rather than to 
the specific facts underlying the crime.’”12  This approach asks 
                                              
8 We review the Board’s decision.  To the extent the 
Board affirms and refers to the immigration court’s decision, 
we review that decision as well.  See Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 
F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2011). 
9 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 838 (1984). 
10 Borrome, 687 F.3d at 154 (rejecting agency deference 
under Chevron). 
11 Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1567.   
12 Id. at 1568 (quoting Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 
478, 483 (2012)). 
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whether the crime “categorically fits within the ‘generic’ 
federal definition of a corresponding aggravated felony.”13   
 
Critically, the categorical approach does not call for 
the consideration of the facts of a particular case.  We “presume 
that the state conviction ‘rested upon the least of the acts’ 
criminalized by the statute, and then we determine whether that 
conduct would fall within the federal definition of the crime.”14  
“[C]ourts ask what elements of a given crime always require—
in effect, what is legally necessary for a conviction.”15  This 
approach has a history in the immigration codes dating back to 
1913,16 and “ordinarily works to promote efficiency, fairness, 
and predictability in the administration of immigration law.”17 
 
Courts “modify” this approach where a crime has 
multiple alternative elements—facts that a prosecutor must 
prove, and a jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt.18  The 
                                              
13 Id. (quoting Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190 
(2013)).   
14 Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 
137 (2010)). 
15 Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 n.1 (2018). 
16 Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal 
Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in 
Immigration law, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1669, 1690-1702 (2011). 
17 Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1986-87 (2015). 
18 Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 269-70 
(2013); see Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 
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modified approach allows adjudicators to look into a limited 
set of documents to see which of the alternatives served as the 
basis for the individual’s conviction.19  Elements are distinct 
from means, which are simply different ways an individual can 
commit an underlying crime, and which do not need to be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.  The modified 
approach “helps implement the categorical approach” when a 
defendant was convicted of violating a divisible statute.20  It 
works “not as an exception, but instead as a tool [that] retains 
the categorical approach’s central feature:  a focus on the 
elements, rather than the facts, of a crime.”21  “Off limits to the 
adjudicator . . . is any inquiry into the particular facts of the 
case.”22 
 
The modified approach only applies when (1) the 
statute of conviction has alternative elements, and (2) “at least 
one” of the alternative divisible categories would, by its 
elements, be a match with a generic federal crime.23     
                                              
(2016) (“A single statute may list elements in the alternative, 
and thereby define multiple crimes.”). 
19 See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249. 
20 Descamps, 570 U.S. at 263.   
21 Id. 
22 Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1986 n.4. 
23 United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 185, 191 (3d Cir. 
2014) (quoting Descamps, 570 U.S. at 264).   
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So courts must determine whether the statute’s “listed 
items are [alternative] elements” that need to be found 
unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt, or are alternative 
means upon which a jury need not agree to sustain a 
conviction.24  For example, in Mathis v. United States, the 
Supreme Court held that a burglary statute involving unlawful 
entry into “any building, structure, or land, water, or air 
vehicle” simply listed alternate means, not elements that 
created separate crimes.25   
 
Even if a statute is divisible, the modified categorical 
approach is only appropriately applied where at least one of the 
divisions matches a qualifying federal crime.26  If all the 
divided categories are still broader than a generic federal 
crime, then the modified categorical approach simply creates a 
nesting doll that replicates the original problem instead of 
resolving it.27  With this framework in mind, we turn to the 
particulars of Hillocks’s appeal, beginning with the Board’s 
conclusion that his conviction constitutes an aggravated 
felony.   
 
                                              
24 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256.   
25 Id. at 2250 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
26 Brown, 765 F.3d 185 at 191. 
27 See id., United States v. Dahl, 833 F.3d 345, 357 (3d 
Cir. 2016).   
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A. Aggravated Felony 
Under the non-modified categorical approach, an 
undivided § 7512(a) plainly does not constitute an aggravated 
felony.  Pennsylvania’s § 7512(a) requires that a defendant (1) 
use a phone28 (2) to facilitate a felony under either (a) 
Pennsylvania’s criminal code29 or (b) its Controlled Substance, 
Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (the “Pennsylvania Controlled 
Substance & Drug Act”).30  As Hillocks points out, this 
encompasses crimes such as “possessing a trade secret with the 
intent to wrongfully deprive the owner of control of it.”31  A 
felony, to be sure, but not an aggravated felony as defined by 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).  A person could violate § 7512(a) by 
facilitating a non-aggravated felony, and using a phone to 
facilitate a non-aggravated felony is not itself an aggravated 
felony.  Therefore, under the “least of the acts” necessary to 
sustain a conviction under § 7512(a), a conviction under it 
would not constitute an aggravated felony under the 
categorical approach. 
 
The Board, however, found that § 7512(a) was a crime 
with alternative elements, requiring the modified categorical 
approach.  In its decision, the Board found that § 7512(a) was 
                                              
28 Or another communications facility. 
29 Or, more specifically, any crime found in Title 18 of 
Pennsylvania’s Consolidated Statutes.  See 18 Pa. C.S. 
§ 7512(a). 
30 35 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann § 780-101 et seq. 
31 Pet’r Br. at 20 (citing 18 Pa. C.S. § 3930). 
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divisible into categories consisting of each possible underlying 
felony.  To determine into which of the purported categories 
Hillocks’s conviction fit, the Board reviewed Hillocks’s plea 
colloquy, and determined that he used a communications 
facility to facilitate the sale of heroin.  Our precedent, however, 
suggests there are problems with the Board’s use of the 
modified categorical approach here.   
 
To begin that analysis, we first consider the possible 
elemental categories into which § 7512(a) might divide.  If 
§ 7512(a) is divisible at all, the most obvious candidates are the 
two alternative categories listed by name in the statute: (a) 
Pennsylvania’s general criminal code32 or (b) the Pennsylvania 
Controlled Substance & Drug Act.33  For reasons already 
discussed, facilitating any felony found in Pennsylvania’s 
general criminal code cannot serve as the basis for an 
aggravated felony determination because not all felonies in that 
title would rise to the level of aggravated felonies.   
 
The second alternative category, facilitating a felony 
found in Pennsylvania’s Controlled Substance & Drug Act, is 
also not a categorical match with a federal aggravated felony.  
The Pennsylvania Controlled Substance & Drug Act makes it 
a crime to distribute not only controlled substances, but also 
non-controlled substances.  For example, the Pennsylvania 
Controlled Substance & Drug Act also makes it a crime to 
distribute “designer drugs,” which are statutorily defined as a 
                                              
32 I.e., any crime found in Title 18 of Pennsylvania’s 
Consolidated Statutes.  See 18 Pa. C.S. § 7512(a). 
33 35 Pa .Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann § 780-101 et seq. 
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substance “other than a controlled substance” that produces an 
effect substantively similar to controlled substances.34  Thus, a 
conviction under the Pennsylvania Controlled Substance & 
Drug Act—by definition—does not necessarily involve a 
“controlled substance.”  That means it cannot be a match with 
the federal aggravated felony indicated by the Board, which 
concerns only controlled substances.  Because neither of these 
categories, by the least of their acts, match with a 
corresponding federal felony, they cannot justify resort to the 
modified categorical approach.35 
 
The categories would still be overbroad even if the 
Board had gone one step further and subdivided that latter 
category into (1) controlled substances under the Pennsylvania 
Controlled Substance & Drug Act, and (2) non-controlled 
substances under the Act.  This is because Pennsylvania 
controlled substance list incorporates several drugs that are not 
on the federal list.36  The Government concedes that 
“Pennsylvania lists more substances on its schedules than the 
                                              
34Id. § 780-102(b). 
35 Brown, 765 F.3d at 191. 
36 Citing to the different drug schedules in his brief, 
Hillocks asserts that, at the time of his conviction, two drugs—
dextrorphan and 1-(3-trifluoromethylphenyl) piperazine—
appeared in the Pennsylvania drug schedules but not the federal 
schedules.  Pet’r Br. 22-23.  This Court previously made note 
that those two drugs did not appear on the federal schedules.  
See Rojas v. Atty. Gen., 728 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2013)(en 
banc).  As we explain below, Rojas has since been abrogated 
on other grounds.       
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federal.”37  That means that an individual could be convicted 
under the Pennsylvania act for a substance that would not be a 
controlled substance under federal law—making 
Pennsylvania’s act broader.  We have previously found that an 
analogous statute with the same problem did not constitute a 
categorical match with a federal crime, and hence was not an 
aggravated felony.38 
 
In that case, Borrome v. Attorney General, this Court 
faced the question whether a conviction under the federal 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act’s wholesale prescription drug 
distribution statutes necessarily involved a “controlled 
substance” such that it matched with the federal Controlled 
Substance Act.  Finding “daylight” between the two acts’ lists, 
we held that “some prescription drugs do contain controlled 
substances, [but the Act] make[s] no distinction between 
convictions involving prescription drugs that do contain 
controlled substances and those that do not.”39  Because the 
convicting court “did not necessarily have to find whether the 
prescription[] drugs involved also contained controlled 
substances,” we found that a conviction there was not a match 
for the Controlled Substance Act, and therefore could not 
constitute an aggravated felony.40  The same reasoning applies 
here:  because the Pennsylvania controlled substances statute 
criminalizes drugs not on the federal schedules, a conviction 
                                              
37 Resp. Br. 16. 
38 Borrome, 687 F.3d at 158. 
39 Id. 
40 Id at 162. 
 16 
under Pennsylvania’s statute would not necessarily constitute 
a categorical match.41  This set of divisions, then, does not 
support use of the modified categorical approach.     
 
The Government concedes those possible categories 
fail and does not argue them before us.  It relies on a different 
theory, however.  It asserts that the appropriate categories are 
not the two statutory codes listed by name in § 7512(a), or 
some variation thereof, but every felony under either of them, 
individually.  Under the Government’s theory, every individual 
felony constitutes a separate, alternate element within 
§ 7512(a).          
 
The Government’s reasoning is thus:  In order to 
prove a crime at trial, the prosecution must prove every 
element beyond a reasonable doubt.  The elements of § 7512(a) 
are:  (1) the defendant knowingly and intentionally used a 
communication facility; (2) the defendant knowingly, 
intentionally, or recklessly facilitated an underlying felony; 
and (3) “the underlying felony occurred.”42  The only way to 
                                              
41 The Board argues that nevertheless “the identity of 
the specific controlled substance is an element” of the crime 
and thus divisible in that regard.  Resp. Br. 16.  That is a 
restatement of its primary argument—that the divisible 
elements are each specific felony—and not an argument in 
support of a proposed category of alternate elements in which 
“controlled substances under the Pennsylvania Controlled 
Substance & Drug Act” is one of the categories.  
42 Commonwealth. v. Moss, 852 A.2d 374, 382 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2004).   
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prove that the underlying felony occurred beyond a reasonable 
doubt is to prove that the individual elements of that felony 
occurred beyond a reasonable doubt.  Because the elements of 
each individual felony must be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and because each individual felony is different, that 
means that each felony must constitute a separate, 
distinguishable element under § 7512(a).  Thus, says the 
Government, each individual felony constitutes a separate 
alternate element to which the modified categorical approach 
applies.   
 
In support, the Government points to 21 U.S.C. 
§ 843(b), a federal statute with some similarities to 
Pennsylvania’s § 7512(a).43  We held in United States v. 
Johnstone that § 843(b) requires the government to prove “(1) 
knowing or intentional (2) use of a communication facility (3) 
to commit, cause or facilitate the commission of a drug 
felony.”44  Johnstone found fault with a jury instruction that 
the final element need be met only by a preponderance of the 
evidence, and we held that the final element needed to be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.45  Pennsylvania courts have 
cited that decision in their own analysis of § 7512(a), finding 
the comparison to § 843(b) helpful.  Citing Johnstone and § 
843(b), the Pennsylvania Superior Court held in 
Commonwealth v. Moss that the elements of § 7512(a) are “(1) 
                                              
43 And which the Board in fact identified as the federal 
categorical match with § 7512(a). 
44 United States v. Johnstone, 856 F.2d 539, 542 (3d. 
Cir. 1988).   
45 Id. 
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[defendant] knowingly and intentionally used a 
communication facility; (2) [defendant] knowingly, 
intentionally or recklessly facilitated an underlying felony; and 
(3) the underlying felony occurred.”46  
 
There are several problems with the Government’s 
reliance on Johnstone and Moss, however.  First is the fact that 
neither Moss nor Johnstone were categorical-approach cases, 
and so did not take up the question of whether either § 843(b) 
or § 7512(a) were divisible.  The only decision cited by the 
parties that did consider § 843(b) in the context of the 
categorical approach, United States v. Maldonado, concluded 
that § 843(b) was indivisible—making the modified 
categorical approach inappropriate. 47  Further, Johnstone and 
Moss only stand for the proposition that a prosecutor must 
show beyond a reasonable doubt that any felony a defendant 
facilitated actually occurred.  These holdings do not prohibit a 
prosecutor—for either § 843(b) or § 7512(a)—from offering 
up multiple facilitated felony options to a jury, nor for jury 
members to disagree on which felony the defendant actually 
facilitated.  If one juror believes the defendant facilitated 
Felony A, and another juror believes the defendant facilitated 
Felony B, then Johnstone and Moss have no problem with that 
outcome, as long as the prosecutor shows beyond a reasonable 
doubt that both occurred.   
                                              
46 Moss, 852 A.2d at 382. 
47 United States v. Maldonado, 636 F. App’x 807, 811 
(2d Cir. 2016) (“Because section 843(b) does not contain 
alternative elements, it is an indivisible statute.”).   
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The Government also points to Pennsylvania’s model 
jury instructions, which read: 
 
The defendant has been charged with criminal 
use of a communication facility.  To find the 
defendant guilty of this offense, you must find 
that the following elements have been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt: 
… 
 
Third, that the crime of [crime] did, in fact, occur.48 
The Government argues that, by listing the category “[crime]” 
to be filled in, this implies that the third element under 
§ 7512(a) requires that the jury must unanimously find that a 
single specified underlying felony occurred.    That would 
make the underlying felony an element of § 7512(a), and not a 
means.      
 
However, this argument is not consistent with our 
precedent, or other persuasive authority.  In United States v. 
Steiner, we concluded that the model Pennsylvania Jury 
Instructions for burglary did “not require the jury to 
unanimously agree on the nature of the location; it can be a 
building, or occupied structure, or a separately secured or 
occupied portion of a building or structure.”49  And certainly it 
is at least as reasonable to believe two jurors could disagree 
                                              
48 Criminal Use of a Communication Facility, Pa. SSJI 
(Crim), § 15.7512 (2016). 
49 847 F.3d 103, 120 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotations 
and citation omitted). 
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about which felony an individual facilitated as it is to believe 
they could disagree over which building a burglar broke into.50 
 
 The Second Circuit in Harbin v. Sessions, a decision 
that relies in part on this Court’s own decision in Borrome, 
considered a case with very similar facts as this matter.  There, 
model jury instructions included an element that read:  “on or 
about [date], in the county of [county], the defendant, 
[defendant’s name], sold [specify].”51  The Second Circuit 
concluded that “[a]lthough the instructions include a blank 
with the word ‘specify’ in it, allowing a judge to name the 
substances at issue in the case, the instructions do not say it is 
impermissible to identify more than one substance.”52  Further, 
“if the judge may allow the jurors a choice between different 
substances, the statute does not create separate crimes—it 
creates separate means of committing the same crime.”53  The 
same logic applies here; nothing suggests that the model 
instructions require a jury to find that one and only one 
underlying felony has occurred.  Section 7512(a)’s model 
instructions do not support the argument that the “[crime]” 
notation suggests that the underlying felony constitutes a 
particular element. 
                                              
50 See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2250 (finding that “a jury 
need not agree on which . . . locations w[ere] actually” burgled 
in Iowa’s burglary statute, and thus the specific locations were 
means, not elements). 
51 Harbin v. Sessions, 860 F.3d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 2017).   
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
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Beyond its articulated arguments, the Government’s 
position does not withstand scrutiny when viewed in the 
context of precedent in this and other Circuits.  To begin, 
courts, including our Court, have typically held that alternate 
elements must be explicitly identified in the statute’s text, not 
read into the language.  The Supreme Court in Mathis held that 
a divisibility analysis is required only as far as a statute is 
“alternatively phrased,”54 and the Fifth Circuit has held that 
“[t]he requirement that a statute must be meaningfully 
alternatively phrased in the first place is implicit in the Mathis 
Court’s analysis.”55  In Descamps, the Supreme Court stated 
that “‘the modified categorical approach that we have 
approved permits a court to determine which statutory phrase 
was the basis for the conviction.’”56  There is only one textual 
clue supporting the proposition that § 7512(a) is divisible:  the 
disjunctive “or” that, at most, separates the statute into a felony 
under either Pennsylvania’s criminal title or its Controlled 
Substance & Drug Act. 
 
When faced with a similar issue, we have previously 
held that a Pennsylvania statute making it a felony to 
communicate a threat to “commit any crime of violence with 
intent to terrorize another” was indivisible.57  We held that, 
                                              
54 136 S. Ct. at 2256.  
55 United States v. Urbina-Fuentes, 900 F.3d 687, 694 
(5th Cir. 2018).   
56 570 U.S. at 263 (quoting Johnson, 559 U.S. at 144).   
57 Brown, 765 F.3d at 193 (citing 18 Pa C.S. § 
2706(a)(1)).   
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while some crimes of violence would constitute an aggravated 
felony, because “[the Pennsylvania statute] does not list each 
crime of violence,” it was indivisible.58   
 
The Government’s position also does not comport 
with other markers that indicate when a crime has multiple 
elements, such as whether different divisible categories result 
in different punishments.  In United States v. Abbott, we 
addressed a provision of the Pennsylvania Controlled 
Substance & Drug Act, 35 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 780-
113(a)(30), and concluded that it was divisible as to each 
controlled substance, an argument that mirrors the 
Government’s in this case.59  However, Abbott’s reason for 
doing so was because “the type of controlled substance 
involved in a violation of 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(30) 
alters the prescribed range of penalties.  Accordingly, the type 
of drug, insofar as it increases the possible range of penalties, 
is an element of the crime.”60   
 
Here, by contrast, the penalty for § 7512(a) does not 
change depending on the underlying felony.  In circumstances 
where the penalties do not vary, other circuits have found that 
the statute is not divisible.61  In Harbin, a case which, like 
                                              
58 Id. 
59 United States v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 
2014); see also Singh v. Att’y Gen., 839 F.3d 273, 282 (3d Cir. 
2016).   
60 Abbott, 748 F.3d at 159.   
61 See, e.g., United States v. McKibbon, 878 F.3d 967, 
975 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding statute indivisible where it “does 
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Abbott, concerned a list of controlled substances, the Second 
Circuit found that because the statute “carries the same 
penalties for each violation . . . each controlled substance is a 
mere ‘means’ of violating the statute, not a separate alternative 
element.”62 
 
In short, precedent and persuasive authority decidedly 
fall against the Board here.  Pennsylvania’s § 7512(a) does not 
have enumerated categories that suggest alternate elements, it 
does not provide different punishments depending on the 
underlying crime, and this Court and others have rejected the 
significance the Government places on the structure of the 
model jury instructions.  We therefore conclude that the 
underlying felonies serving as a basis for a conviction under 
§ 7512(a) are means, not separate elements.63  
 
Because the Government has not identified divisible 
categories, at least one of which would match a generic federal 
                                              
not provide different punishments depending on” the proposed 
alternate elements). 
62 Harbin, 860 F.3d at 65.  
63 Even if we were to agree that each individual felony 
did constitute a separate element under § 7512(a), there would 
still be a further question as to whether § 7512(a) is a true 
categorical match with the corresponding federal crime, 
§ 843(b).  Hillocks argues that the two have different scienter 
requirements.  Having already found that § 7512(a) cannot by 
the least of its acts constitute an aggravated felony under the 
categorical approach, we need not further consider the scienter 
issue. 
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aggravated felony, the modified categorical approach is not 
appropriately applied to § 7512(a).  And under the categorical 
approach, Hillocks’s conviction under § 7512(a) does not 
constitute an aggravated felony, because “the least of its acts” 
do not have a corresponding match with a comparable federal 
aggravated felony.   
 
B. Relating to a Controlled Substance 
The Board also concluded that Hillocks’s conviction 
was related to a controlled substance, which is a separate 
ground for removal.64  Our precedent currently does not apply 
the categorical approach to determine whether a state statute 
relates to a controlled substance.  Instead, we look at the 
conviction documents to determine whether a federally 
controlled substance was involved “in the same way as the 
existence of the conviction itself is normally established.”65  
This analysis was laid out in our decision in Rojas v. Attorney 
General.66  
                                              
64 The Board argues that Hillocks has failed to exhaust 
this argument, because he did not explicitly reference it in his 
appeal from the immigration judge to the Board.  However, the 
Board addressed it sua sponte in its decision, JA 7 (affirming 
immigration judge’s “conclusion that [Hillocks’s] conviction . 
. . renders him removable under section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)), and 
we have held that “we have jurisdiction” when “the BIA 
considers the issue sua sponte.”  Lin v. Att’y Gen, 543 F.3d 
114, 123-24 (3d Cir. 2008).     
65 Rojas, 728 F.3d at 216. 
66 Id.   
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However, after Rojas was decided, the Supreme Court 
issued Mellouli v. Lynch, which applied the categorical 
approach to determine whether a state conviction related to a 
controlled substance.67  The Government here does not contest 
that Mellouli applied the categorical approach.68  It instead 
argues that the Court need not consider it, because Hillocks 
would fail under either test.  However, we have already 
rejected the Government’s categorical approach arguments as 
they relate to whether his conviction is an aggravated felony.  
Mellouli’s impact on Rojas dictates the outcome here. 
 
And Mellouli does apply the categorical approach to 
the question of whether a state crime relates to a controlled 
substance.69  It stated that “[t]he categorical approach has been 
applied routinely to assess whether a state drug conviction 
triggers removal under the immigration statute” and that 
“[u]nder the categorical approach . . ., Mellouli’s drug-
paraphernalia conviction does not render him deportable” 
because the state conviction was not categorically limited to 
federally-defined controlled substances.70  We therefore 
conclude that Mellouli abrogated Rojas’s test, and directs us to 
                                              
67 135 S. Ct. at 1986-89. 
68 Resp. Br. 21 (“In Mellouli, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged the use of the modified categorical approach . . 
. .”). 
69 135 S. Ct. at 1986-1989. 
70 Id. at 1988. 
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apply the categorical approach to the question of whether a 
particular state offense relates to a controlled substance.71  
  
The question of whether § 7512(a) relates to a 
controlled substance is not materially distinct from the 
question of whether it is an aggravated felony, and the same 
reasoning applies with equal force to both.  The analysis is 
therefore the same and need not be repeated here.  For the same 
reasons we hold that § 7512(a) does not categorically 
constitute an aggravated felony, we also hold that it does not 
relate to a controlled substance.   
 
Because, applying the categorical approach, 
Hillocks’s conviction under § 7512(a) is neither an aggravated 
felony nor related to a controlled substance, it cannot serve as 
the basis for removal, as the Board held it did. 
 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, Hillocks’s order of removal 
will be vacated, and this matter will be remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 
                                              
71 This abrogation only extends to the appropriate test to 
determine whether a state crime relates to a controlled 
substance.  Rojas otherwise remains good law in this Circuit. 
